

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 BONN 12801 01 OF 03 082135Z

62

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 IO-10 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07 L-03

NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 DODE-00 NSC-05

ACDA-05 CU-02 NEA-10 EB-07 /102 W
----- 005067

R 081230Z AUG 75

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1996

INFO USMISSION USBERLIN

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

AMEMBASSY BERN

AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BONN 12801

(C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - AMEMBASSY BERLIN ADDED AS
INFO ADDRESSEE)

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, GW, UR, WB, XH

SUBJECT: CSCE SUMMIT: FRG BILATERAL TALKS WITH SOVIETS
AND EAST EUROPEANS

REF: (A) BONN 12732; (B) BONN 12721; (C) BONN 12722;
(D) BONN 12371 (ALL NOTAL)

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 BONN 12801 01 OF 03 082135Z

BEGIN SUMMARY: FRG CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT'S HELSINKI MEETING WITH BREZHNEV WAS CHARACTERIZED AS "TOUGH" BY THE FONOFF, AND THERE WERE NO BREAKTHROUGHS EITHER IN THE LONG-PENDING NUCLEAR POWER PLANT NEGOTIATIONS OR IN THE BILATERAL AGREEMENTS WHICH ARE STALLED OVER THE INCLUSION OF BERLIN. SCHMIDT'S CONVERSATION WITH TITO WAS THE MOST INTERESTING OF HIS BILATERALS WITH EAST EUROPEAN LEADERS, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE OF TITO'S AGREEMENT TO TRY TO INFLUENCE THE NONALIGNED, AT THE LIMA CONFERENCE, AGAINST ACTION AIMED AT EXPELLING ISRAEL FROM THE UN. LITTLE OF SUBSTANCE EMERGED FROM THE TALKS WITH THE CZECHS, ROMANIANS, HUNGARIANS, AND BULGARIANS. END SUMMARY.

1. FOLLOWING UP REPORTS IN THE BONN GROUP ON THE FRG TALKS WITH THE EAST GERMANS AT HELSINKI (REFS A AND B) AND THE FONOFF BRIEFING ON THE POLISH NEGOTIATIONS (REF C), FONOFF EAST-WEST RELATIONS DIVISION CHIEF, MEYER-LANDRUT, BRIEFED EMBOFF AUGUST 7 ON CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT'S CONVERSATIONS WITH BREZHNEV AND THE OTHER EAST EUROPEAN LEADERS.

SOVIET BILATERAL

2. NUCLEAR POWER PLANT: MEYER-LANDRUT CHARACTERIZED THE SCHMIDT-BREZHNEV TALKS AS "RATHER TOUGH." AFTER INTRODUCTORY REMARKS ABOUT THE WINDING UP OF CSCE AND SMALL TALK ON DETENTE, SCHMIDT CAME QUICKLY TO THE SUBJECT OF BILATERAL RELATIONS AND, SPECIFICALLY, TO THE STALLED NEGOTIATIONS ON THE KALININGRAD NUCLEAR POWER PLANT. HAVING INTRODUCED THE SUBJECT WITH REMARKS ON THE STEEL PLANT PROJECT AND THE TRILATERAL GAS PROJECT WITH IRAN, BOTH OF WHICH WERE PROGRESSING SATISFACTORILY, SCHMIDT SAID THE SOVIETS HAD BEEN DRAGGING THEIR FEET ON THE NUCLEAR PROJECT FOR SO LONG THAT HE WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD BLUNTLY SAY, "NO, IT'S IMPOSSIBLE." IT WOULD BE BETTER TO HAVE NOTHING THAN TO CONTINUE THE PRESENT UNCLEAR SITUATION. BREZHNEV RESPONDED RATHER INDIGNANTLY. HE SAID THE SOVIETS HAD ALREADY EXPLAINED THE SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 BONN 12801 01 OF 03 082135Z

DIFFICULTIES THEY WERE HAVING IN THEIR TALKS WITH THE POLES AND THE EAST GERMANS, NOTED THAT THOSE TALKS WERE CONTINUING, AND SAID THAT THERE WERE STILL TECHNICAL ASPECTS WHICH REQUIRED DECISIONS FROM THE GERMAN SIDE AND WHICH SHOULD BE RESOLVED FIRST. SCHMIDT SAID THE TECHNICAL ASPECTS COULD BE RESOLVED EASILY ONCE THE POLITICAL DECISIONS WERE REACHED. THE CONVERSATION ENDED IN AN IMPASSE.

3. BERLIN AND FRG-SOVIET BILATERAL RELATIONS: FOREIGN MINISTERS GENSCHER AND GROMYKO CARRIED MOST OF THIS PORTION OF THE CONVERSATION, WITH GENSCHER STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE OF INCLUDING BERLIN IN A SATISFACTORY FORM IN FRG RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. GROMYKO INSISTED THAT THE GERMANS SHOULD BE MORE FLEXIBLE ON THIS MATTER. THE VARIOUS PENDING NEGOTIATIONS WERE REVIEWED AND THE POSITIONS OF BOTH SIDES WERE RESTATED. IN THE END, THE TWO SIDES WERE AS FAR APART AS THEY HAD BEEN SINCE LAST AUTUMN. MEYER-LANDRUT SAID THE GERMANS REALIZED THAT THEIR CONCLUSIONS AFTER LAST FALL'S SCHMIDT-BREZHNEV SUMMIT (THAT MOST OF THE DIFFICULTIES HAD BEEN RESOLVED) HAD BEEN INACCURATE. THERE WERE SOME RATHER UNEASY MOMENTS DURING THE CONVERSATION, BUT

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 BONN 12801 02 OF 03 081253Z

44

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 IO-10 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07 L-03

NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 DODE-00 NSC-05

ACDA-05 CU-02 NEA-10 EB-07 /102 W

----- 129628

R 081230Z AUG 75

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1997

INFO USMISSION USBERLIN

AMEMBASSY BERN

AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 03 BONN 12801

AT THE END THE ATMOSPHERE CLEARED A BIT. THE WHOLE CONVERSATION WAS, HOWEVER, OF NO EFFECT WHATSOEVER.

4. FUTURE CONTACTS: GENSCHER SAID HE WAS IN PRINCIPLE AGREEABLE TO GROMYKO'S PROPOSAL THAT HE VISIT THE SOVIET UNION BUT SUGGESTED THEY DECIDE AFTER FURTHER TALKS AT THE UNGA WHETHER TO FIX A DATE OR NOT. GENSCHER NOTED THAT HE WOULD, IN ANY CASE, BE ACCOMPANYING FRG PRESIDENT SCHEEL TO THE SOVIET UNION IN NOVEMBER. THE SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 BONN 12801 02 OF 03 081253Z

INVITATION WHICH SCHMIDT HAD EXTENDED LAST FALL FOR BREZHNEV TO VISIT THE FRG WAS RENEWED, BUT NO DATE WAS AGREED UPON. BREZHNEV SAID HE WOULD BE VERY BUSY IN COMING MONTHS PREPARING FOR HIS VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET PARTY CONGRESS, AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST CONFERENCE, AND WOULD BE UNABLE TO ARRANGE A DATE FOR AN FRG VISIT BEFORE THE END OF THE PARTY CONGRESS.

5. EMBOFF REFERRED TO THE PRELIMINARY FONOFF ANALYSIS OF BREZHNEV'S REMARKS ON BERLIN DURING THE RECENT BRANDT VISIT TO MOSCOW (REF D) AND ASKED WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN ANY FURTHER ANALYSIS IN THE LIGHT OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE BRANDT TALKS THEMSELVES AND THE HELSINKI TALKS. MEYER-LANDRUT SAID HE STILL HAD VERY LITTLE INFORMATION ON THE BRANDT-BREZHNEV TALKS BUT THAT HIS CONCLUSION WAS THAT WHAT BREZHNEV WAS SAYING IN HIS TOAST WAS THAT THERE WOULD BE NO DIFFICULTIES OVER BERLIN SO LONG AS THE FRG FOLLOWED THE SOVIET LINE.

EAST EUROPEAN BILATERALS

6. YUGOSLAVIA: MEYER-LANDRUT DESCRIBED THE MEETING WITH TITO AND MINIC AS THE MOST INTERESTING OF THE EAST EUROPEAN TALKS. WHILE IT WOULD NOT BE NEW FOR WASHINGTON, HE SAID, SINCE THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY HAD JUST VISITED BELGRADE, IT WAS OF GREAT INTEREST FOR THE GERMANS THAT TITO VERY EXPLICITLY ACCEPTED AND SUPPORTED THE GERMAN POSITION ON ISRAEL AND THE UN. SCHMIDT WAS VERY SPECIFIC ON THE DANGERS FOR THE UN OF AN EXPULSION OF ISRAEL, AND TITO AGREED

AND SAID HE WOULD TRY TO INFLUENCE THE NONALIGNED AT THE LIMA CONFERENCE. ALTHOUGH TITO MADE THE USUAL NOISES TO THE EFFECT THAT MORE PRESSURE SHOULD BE PUT ON ISRAEL, HE MADE HIS OPPOSITION TO CURTAILMENT OF ISRAELI RIGHTS IN THE UN QUITE CLEAR. ON CYPRUS, TITO SAID THE YUGOSLAVS HAD EARLIER TRIED TO EXTEND GOOD OFFICES, BUT THERE HAD BEEN BY NOW SO MUCH HARDENING OF POSITIONS THAT THERE WAS VERY LITTLE CHANCE THAT YUGOSLAVIA COULD HELP REACH A SOLUTION. THE YUGOSLAVS REMAINED GREATLY CONCERNED OVER THE CYPRUS SITUATION, SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 BONN 12801 02 OF 03 081253Z

HOWEVER. AS IN ALL OF HIS BILATERAL TALKS, SCHMIDT SPOKE WITH TITO ABOUT ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND POINTED OUT THE NEED FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN THE OIL PRODUCING COUNTRIES ON THE ONE HAND AND THE RAW MATERIAL PRODUCERS AND THE INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES ON THE OTHER.

7. CZECHOSLOVAKIA: THE TALKS WITH HUSAK CENTERED ON HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE ONLY ABOUT 10,000 GERMANS WISHING TO LEAVE CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND IT WOULD NOT HARM THE CZECH GOVERNMENT TO ALLOW THEM TO EMIGRATE, IT SEEMS CLEAR, MEYER-LANDRUT SAID, THAT THE GERMANS WILL NOT SUCCEED IN GETTING THEM OUT. GENSCHER HAD DISCUSSED THE PROBLEM IN PRAGUE IN APRIL TO NO

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 BONN 12801 03 OF 03 081300Z

44

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 IO-10 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07 L-03

NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 DODE-00 NSC-05

ACDA-05 CU-02 NEA-10 EB-07 /102 W

----- 129727

R 081230Z AUG 75
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1998
INFO USMISSION USBERLIN
AMEMBASSY BERN
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 03 BONN 12801

EFFECT, HENCE SCHMIDT RAISED IT WITH HUSAK. THERE WAS
STILL NO AGREEMENT.

8. HUNGARY: THE MEETING WITH KADAR WAS VERY SHORT AND
NOTHING NOTEWORTHY WAS DISCUSSED. THERE WAS TALK OF A
KADAR VISIT TO THE FRG AND IT WAS LEFT THAT THIS MIGHT
BE POSSIBLE IN 1976.

9. ROMANIA: THE TALKS WITH CEAUSESCU WERE MORE SUB-
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 BONN 12801 03 OF 03 081300Z

STANTIVE, WITH TWO SUBJECTS DISCUSSED.

A. SCHMIDT MENTIONED THE RECENT CATASTROPHIC FLOODS
(AFTER WHICH THE FRG PROVIDED CONSIDERABLE ASSISTANCE IN
REBUILDING ROADS, BRIDGES, RAILROADS AND THE TELEPHONE
NETWORK), BUT CEAUSESCU BRUSHED THIS ASIDE WITH THE
OBSERVATION THAT THERE IS NO LONGER ANY DISCUSSION OF
THE FLOOD DAMAGE.

B. CEAUSESCU SAID WHAT WAS ESSENTIAL WAS TO BALANCE
THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND THAT THE FRG SHOULD IMPORT
MORE FROM ROMANIA. MEYER-LANDRUT OBSERVED THAT THIS
WAS NOT EASY (THE ROMANIANS DON'T ALWAYS DELIVER ON
INDUSTRIAL GOODS, WHICH ARE NOT ESPECIALLY GOOD ANYWAY,
AND AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS CAUSE PROBLEMS WITH THE COMMON
MARKET); BUT SCHMIDT NEVERTHELESS AGREED TO DISCUSSIONS
OF THE SUBJECT AT THE EXPERT LEVEL.

10. BULGARIA: MEYER-LANDRUT SAID THAT RELATIONS WITH

BULGARIA ARE RATHER UNTROUBLED. BOTH SIDES REFERRED
TO THE FORTHCOMING VISIT BY ZHIVKOV TO THE FRG
(NOVEMBER 24-28, 1975), WHICH HAD BEEN ARRANGED
PREVIOUSLY BUT WHICH HAS NOT YET BEEN ANNOUNCED.
HILLENBRAND

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: AGREEMENTS, NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS, SUMMIT MEETINGS, TRAVEL CONTROLS, NEGOTIATIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 08 AUG 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: MartinML
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975BONN12801
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750274-1111
From: BONN
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750867/aaaacgtj.tel
Line Count: 336
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 75 BONN 12732, 75 BONN 12721, 75 BONN 12722
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: MartinML
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 18 APR 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <18 APR 2003 by CunninFX>; APPROVED <24 SEP 2003 by MartinML>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
06 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CSCE SUMMIT: FRG BILATERAL TALKS WITH SOVIETS AND EAST EUROPEANS
TAGS: PFOR, GE, UR, WB, XH, CSCE, (SCHMIDT, HELMUT), (BREZHNEV, LEONID I), (TITO, JOSIP BROZ)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006